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SUMMARY: In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between the external
financial statement audit and the method of payment across a sample of Belgian
mergers and acquisitions between listed and private firms over the period 1997–2009.
We investigate whether a Big N audit (at the target level) reduces the need for a
contingent payment resulting from information asymmetry about the target’s value. In
addition, we analyze whether a Big N audit (at the bidder level) limits incentives for
bidders to exploit private information about their own value. Using multivariate ordered
probit and binary regression models, we determine that contingent payments are less
common when the target is audited by a Big N auditor after controlling for several other
deal and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that the incentive to use stock
payments in periods of stock market overvaluation is lower for acquirers with a Big N
auditor. Finally, target shareholders are more likely to accept a contingent offer if the
acquirer’s financial statements are certified by a Big N auditor.
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions; audit quality; Big N auditor; method of payment.
JEL Classifications: G34; M4.
INTRODUCTION
T
he need for external auditing stems from information asymmetry between the insiders and
outsiders of the firm. The main purpose of an external financial statement audit is to
enhance the credibility of the disclosed financial figures, vis-à-vis potential investors, by
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providing an independent certification of the information presented in the financial statements.
Hence, a high-quality financial statement audit is likely to reduce the information asymmetry
between informed managers and the firm’s outside stakeholders. In this study, we analyze the
effectiveness of the external financial statement audit in reducing information asymmetry in the
context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). M&As constitute an interesting setting in which to
investigate the impact of an external financial statement audit because there is considerable
information asymmetry between the acquiring and the target firm. One area of information
asymmetry relates to the value of the target firm. Bidders make an offer to target shareholders based
upon their estimate of the target value (and their expected synergy gains). However, the target firm
is better informed about its own value than the bidder. The bidder may solve this problem by
making the payment to the target shareholders contingent upon future performance (Officer,
Poulsen, and Stegemoller 2009; Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel 1990; Hansen 1987). If the
acquirer offers stock, the value of the offer depends on how the market assesses the M&A, resulting
in risk-sharing between the target and the acquirer. In cash-paid transactions, on the other hand,
bidders bear the full risk of overvaluation and unrealized synergy gains that was originally
embedded in the acquisition premium (e.g., Rappaport and Switzer 1999). We argue that an
external financial statement audit will influence the need for risk-sharing by reducing uncertainty
about the target’s financial figures and, consequently, its value.
A second information asymmetry relates to the value of the bidder. Because bidders have
private information about their own value, they may try to exploit this information advantage by
offering stock when they are overvalued (Myers and Majluf 1984; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
2004; Shleifer and Vishny 2003). This might explain why stock offers are typically found to result
in inferior returns for bidding firm shareholders (e.g., Bruner 2004). Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary
(2009), however, show that a high-quality external financial statement audit mitigates information
asymmetry and, hence, reduces the impact of market-timing behavior on the firm’s capital structure.
We extend their analysis by examining the impact of audit quality on the method of payment in
M&As. The certification of the bidder’s financial statements by a high-quality auditor is likely to
limit the bidder’s incentives to use stock as a method of payment due to lower information
asymmetry.
In this paper, we use ordered probit analysis and binary regression analysis to investigate the
impact of the external financial statement audit on the method of payment across a sample of 125
M&As between Belgian firms, using data from the period 1997–2009. We believe Belgium to be an
interesting setting in which to investigate auditor impact because an external financial statement
audit is mandatory for large Belgian firms regardless of whether they are listed.1 In addition, small
firms can opt for a voluntary financial statement audit. Auditor names and accounting data are
publicly available because all Belgian firms (both listed and unlisted) are required to file their
financial statements with the National Bank of Belgium, and these are subsequently made public.
This widespread mandatory audit requirement (unlike in many other countries) stems from the
desire to protect all firm stakeholders (e.g., Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout 2012;
Gaeremynck, Van Der Meulen, and Willekens 2008). Like many prior studies, our study uses
auditor size as a proxy for audit quality (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Dye 1993). Belgium also provides an
interesting setting in this respect because Big N auditors only serve approximately half of the
Belgian audit market, whereas the Big N market share typically amounts to more than 90 percent in
the public client segment for Anglo-Saxon countries (Weets and Jegers 1997). The more balanced
distribution of Big N and non-Big N market shares in Belgium improves the quality of our
1 According to Belgian law, firms are considered to be large if they have more than 100 employees (average over
the year) or if they exceed two of the following thresholds: (1) 50 employees (average over the year); (2) total
assets of €3,650,000; and (3) sales of €7,300,000.
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statistical tests and might even be a necessary condition for analyzing audit quality effects across a
sample of M&As, which is typically a relatively small sample of the overall population.
The contributions of our study can be summarized as follows. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to investigate the relationship between audit quality and the method of payment in
M&A transactions. Although the impact of audit quality and the determinants of payment method
in M&As have been thoroughly investigated separately, there is no empirical evidence of the
relationship between the two. Whereas some studies have examined the impact of the auditor on
M&A transactions (e.g., De Franco, Gavious, Jin, and Richardson 2011; Louis 2005), they have
only focused on target or bidder returns. Moreover, these studies typically consider only one aspect
of the double-sided information asymmetry problem in M&A transactions. De Franco et al. (2011),
for example, focus on target valuation and show that private targets hiring Big N auditors receive
significantly higher proceeds. Our study considers audit quality at both the bidder and the target
level. Louis (2005) is one of the only studies that focuses on audit quality at the acquirer level in
M&A deals. Louis shows that non-Big N clients realize significantly higher cumulative abnormal
announcement returns than do Big N clients, and he attributes this difference to the superior
advisory role of small auditors in M&A transactions. However, Dee, Lulseged, and Nelson (2009)
argue that the significant outperformance of small auditors in M&A transactions might spuriously
capture the acquirer size effect. In models that correct for both auditor type and acquirer size, only
the acquirer size effect appears to be significant. Unlike these studies, our paper does not focus on
the advisory function of auditors. Rather, we investigate the role of the acquirer’s and target’s
auditor in reducing information asymmetry regarding their own value, as this asymmetry is likely to
have a significant impact on the method of payment for the M&A. Although small auditors might
have a comparative advantage when providing M&A services for acquiring firms in local markets
(e.g., advice about the target’s value), Big N auditors might succeed in making financial statements
more credible, and hence, might increase the value of their own clients. Accordingly, our results
and those of Louis (2005) are not necessarily conflicting but are likely to capture different effects.
Next, unlike De Franco et al. (2011), our sample also includes private acquirers. Due to the greater
information risk for private acquirers relative to listed acquirers, the double-sided asymmetric
information problem is likely to play a more prevalent role in our study. Lennox (2005) argues that
investors in unlisted firms have a greater demand for high-quality external auditor certification
because they typically suffer more from information asymmetry. Their higher information risk,
compared to that of listed firms, stems from their more limited product-market scope, lower
reporting quality and lower level of public screening (by e.g., investors and/or financial analysts).
Moreover, total stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP equaled 44.9 percent in
Belgium in 2011, which is considerably lower than the same figure in the U.S., where it amounted
to 103.6 percent. Thus, given the importance of private firms in Belgium and, by extension,
continental Europe, we contend that a study on the impact of audit quality in M&A transactions
should include data on private targets as well as acquirers. Finally, despite important differences
between the audit settings of Continental European and Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., lower
litigation risk, more widespread audit requirements, and less concentration in the audit market), the
bulk of the audit quality literature uses data from Anglo-Saxon countries. Our study carefully
explores the specific characteristics of the Belgian audit context.
This paper might also be very relevant in view of current mixed evidence regarding the validity
of auditor size as a proxy for audit quality. Recent studies indicating a Big N quality effect provide
evidence of the higher accuracy of analyst forecasts for Big N clients (Behn, Choi, and Kang 2008),
a lower incidence of fraud among Big N clients (Farber 2005), more accurate audit opinions by Big
N auditors (Geiger and Ramma 2006), and a more pronounced effect of legal investor protection
(Francis and Wang 2008). In contrast, other recent articles find no evidence of Big N auditors
providing higher quality. Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011), for example, report that the
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effects of Big 4 auditors on discretionary accruals, the ex ante cost-of-equity capital, and analyst
forecast accuracy are insignificantly different from those of non-Big 4 auditors, and they argue that
perceived differences in the prior literature largely reflect client characteristics. Fortin and Pittman
(2007) fail to find lower yield spreads or higher ratings on bond issues for private firms with Big 4
auditors. Finally, Louis (2005) shows that acquirers audited by non-Big 4 auditors outperform those
audited by Big 4 auditors at merger announcements and explains this finding as a function of the
advisory role of auditors in M&A transactions. These mixed findings induce a strong need for
further research on the issue in different settings.
Our empirical results suggest that a high-quality financial statement audit reduces information
asymmetry with regard to the target’s and the acquirer’s value. More specifically, we find that the
method of payment in M&As is less likely to be contingent if the target is audited by a Big N
auditor because of the lower need to overcome information asymmetry problems. Furthermore,
acquirers are more likely to opt for contingent payments in periods of stock market overvaluation,
but this effect is mitigated when the acquirer engages a Big N auditor. These findings also hold
when the market-wide valuation measure is replaced with firm-level data (for the listed firms). In
addition, target shareholders are more likely to accept contingent offers when the acquirer’s
financial statements are certified by a Big N auditor. Our conclusions hold when we control for a
potential self-selection bias in various ways. More specifically, we re-estimate our model only for
the deals without a pre-M&A auditor change. In addition, we use propensity-score matching to
create a balanced sample of Big N and non-Big N acquirers. Also, excluding targets (acquirers) that
are larger than the largest target (acquirer) with a non-Big N auditor and all targets (acquirers) that
are smaller than the smallest target (acquirer) with a Big N auditor does not alter our conclusions.
Finally, our findings prove to be robust to a wide set of sensitivity analyses.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the
previous literature and formulate our hypotheses. Our sample is introduced subsequently, followed
by a detailed discussion of our results and robustness checks. Finally, we summarize our main
conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
In this section, we summarize the prior literature and present our hypotheses. We start by
highlighting the role of an external financial statement audit in reducing information asymmetry,
and discuss the relationship between auditor size and audit quality. Next, we elaborate on the
impact of information asymmetry on the target’s and acquirer’s valuation, respectively, and develop
hypotheses concerning the effect of audit quality on the method of payment. Finally, we briefly
discuss control variables that have been found to explain the method of payment in M&As in prior
studies.
The Auditor’s Role in Mitigating Information Asymmetry
External auditors play a dual role in financial markets (e.g., Dye 1993; Mansi, Maxwell, and
Miller 2004; O’Reilly, Leitch, and Tuttle 2006). First, they reduce information asymmetry for
capital market participants (the information role) by offering an independent verification of
financial statements and by reporting potential breaches in clients’ financial accounts. As such, they
improve the credibility of financial reports and make contracting with a firm less costly (Watts and
Zimmerman 1986). Second, they provide investors with a claim on the auditor that they can employ
in the event of an audit failure (the insurance role). Following DeAngelo (1981) and Dye (1993),
we assume that large audit firms provide superior audit quality. The underlying rationale is that
large auditors have more at stake if they fail to report on misstatements (deeper pockets). Based on
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this consideration, it is common to rely on the so-called brand name variable (i.e., Big N versus
non-Big N) in distinguishing between large and small(er) audit firms.2
Unlike the Anglo-Saxon audit environment, the Belgian context is characterized by weak
investor rights and, hence, a dearth of auditor litigation. This is a typical characteristic of
countries that feature conservative government-prescribed accounting standards and countries
whose banks or governments are the major providers of capital (Vanstraelen 2002). In the
absence of a litigation threat, the reputation incentive is the remaining force that generates an
audit quality differential. Big N auditors typically have a larger client base,3 which leads to
greater potential losses in case of reputational damage. These losses could stem from clients
switching auditors and/or from downward pressure on audit fees. That is, consistent with
reputation effects, Dutillieux and Willekens (2009) confirm the existence of a Big 4 brand name
premium in the Belgian context. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) argue that the scrutiny of
tax authorities in countries with high tax alignment, like Belgium, increases the probability of
failure of detection, which might negatively affect auditor reputation. This threat will provide an
incentive for Big N audit firms to protect their reputation by providing higher quality financial
statement audits.
Some studies have specifically focused on the motives for preserving audit quality in
countries in which litigation essentially plays no role, offering a clean test of the reputation
rationale. Fan and Wong (2005), for example, illustrate that external auditors perform a corporate
governance role in East Asia, despite the weak legal environment. Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez-
Aguilar, and Carrera (2009) examine audit reports for financially stressed firms in Spain, and find
that the reputation concerns of Big N audit firms help to maintain auditor independence. In the
German context, Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang (2008) show that KPMG’s clients sustained
negative abnormal returns around the widely publicized accounting scandal of one of its clients
(ComROAD AG). Similarly, Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) study the failed audit of Kanebo (a
large Japanese cosmetics firm that engaged in a massive accounting fraud) that was conducted by
ChuoAoyama, PwC’s Japanese affiliate. Consistent with the importance of auditor reputation,
they show that approximately one fourth of ChuoAoyama’s clients switched auditors after the
firm’s suspension. In sum, these empirical studies suggest that the reputation incentive leads to a
superior auditor size quality effect in settings in which the risk of litigation is limited. In addition
to the aforementioned reasons (i.e., loss of clients and/or downward pressure on audit fees), this
link can be explained by the fact that, given the international dimension of Big N brand names,
reputation concerns in one country (e.g., Belgium) may lead to negative spillover to other
countries (e.g., Cahan, Emanuel, and Sun 2009).
2 The notion of superior Big N audit quality has been supported by many prior studies. A Big N audit, for
example, has been associated with less underpricing of new issues (e.g., Willenborg 1999; Beatty 1989; Balvers,
McDonald, and Miller 1988; Titman and Trueman 1986) and higher pre-M&A values (De Franco et al. 2011).
Several scholars also provide evidence of less earnings management by Big N auditors (e.g., Becker, DeFond,
Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999). Furthermore, Big N auditors are found
to provide more accurate distress signals (Lennox 1999) and face lower litigation rates (Palmrose 1988). Teoh
and Wong (1993) also report that stock price reactions following unexpected positive earnings announcements
are higher for firms audited by Big N auditors. Finally, the cost of debt financing is lower if the firm is audited by
a Big N auditor (e.g., Mansi et al. 2004). Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen, Simunic, and Stein (2006) examine how audits
performed by Big N and non-Big N auditors differ. Their evidence suggests that the higher audit quality of Big N
firms is driven by a less procedural and more contextual approach. Moreover, Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen, Simunic,
and Stein (2003) find that Big N auditors use lower quantitative materiality levels than do non-Big N auditors.
3 Despite their lower concentration in the Belgian audit market, Big N auditors still account for approximately half
of the market share in Belgium (Weets and Jegers 1997). In our sample, 52 percent of the audited targets and
62.71 percent of the audited acquirers are Big N clients.
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Consistent with the concept of the reputation incentive, several studies provide evidence of
superior Big N audit quality in the non-litigious Belgian context. Gaeremynck and Willekens
(2003) find that Big N auditors in Belgium are more likely to issue a non-clean audit opinion than
are non-Big N auditors when financial difficulties are less apparent, as in the case of firms that
voluntarily decide to liquidate. Vander Bauwhede, Willekins, and Gaeremynck (2003) show that
Big N auditors constrain income-decreasing earnings management more than non-Big N auditors
in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market. Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout
(2012) provide evidence of higher leverage ratios for Big N clients and attribute their findings to
the higher information quality associated with these firms. As previously mentioned, Dutillieux
and Willekens (2009) confirm the existence of a Big 4 brand name premium in the Belgian
context. However, other papers fail to find evidence of quality differentiation (e.g., Gaeremynck
et al. 2008; Vander Bauwhede and Willekens 2004).
Based on the aforementioned considerations, we will use the Big N dummy variable as a
proxy for audit quality.4 Nevertheless, given the lower concentration in the Belgian audit market
(Weets and Jegers 1997; Francis and Wang 2008), we also consider alternative variables as
proxies for differences in audit quality between large and small(er) audit firms as a robustness
check. One dummy variable is set equal to 1 if the audit firm is among the five largest in Belgium.
We also consider the ten largest audit firms using a second dummy variable. A third dummy
variable equals 1 if the auditor’s market share equals at least 5 percent (e.g., DeFond, Francis, and
Wong 2000). The market shares used for these variables are based upon the number of clients as
well as the clients’ assets. Untabulated results (available upon request from the authors) indicate
that the sum of the market shares of the ten largest audit firms in Belgium evolves in a relatively
stable manner. The aggregated market share amounts to approximately 50 percent of all clients
and increases slightly over the period under study. Moreover, the Big 6 (1997), Big 5 (1998–
2001) or Big 4 (2002–2008) audit firms consistently have the largest market shares, which
indicates that Big N audit firms dominate the Belgian audit market, although the market is far less
concentrated than that of Anglo-Saxon countries.
Information Asymmetry in the Context of Mergers and Acquisitions
A double-sided information asymmetry problem arises in the case of M&As. Both targets and
acquirers possess proprietary information about their own value, which influences the method of
payment. In what follows, we assume that the bidding firm decides upon the method of payment
offered. Of course, we recognize that targets will have to approve the method of payment before
they actually accept the deal. However, Faccio and Masulis (2005) explicitly state that ‘‘if a target’s
financing choice is unacceptable to the bidder, then the proposed M&A transaction is likely to be
aborted or else the bidder can make a hostile offer on its own terms. For a deal to succeed, the
bidder must be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal.’’
The target’s acceptance of the deal is more likely to depend on the premium offered than to
depend on the method of payment. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that fiduciary
responsibility requires the target management to accept any offer that yields more than the stand-
alone value. In what follows, we build four potential scenarios based on target and acquirer
valuation. However, because the bidding firm is not aware of the true value of the target, we focus
4 Alternatively, audit fees could be used as a proxy for audit effort (and, thus, audit quality). Unfortunately, audit
fees have only become publicly available in Belgium as of accounting year 2007, which makes it impossible for
us to run our models using audit fees as an alternative proxy for audit quality. However, the observed Big 4
premium in the Belgian context (see Dutillieux and Willekens 2009) provides support for our strategy of relying
on the brand name variable.
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on uncertainty about target valuation rather than on the extent of target over- or undervaluation. The
different scenarios are summarized in Table 1. Finally, we argue that a high-quality external
financial statement audit is likely to reduce information asymmetry about target and acquirer and,
hence, will affect the method of payment.
In the M&A literature, the method of payment choice has shown to be an efficient signal that
reduces uncertainty resulting from information asymmetry about the target’s value (Bruner 2004;
Eckbo et al. 1990; Hansen 1987). Hansen (1987) argues that a lemons problem will arise if targets
have private information about their own value. Given this information asymmetry between targets
and acquirers, the target firm will only be sold when its value falls below the offer made. Acquirers
can protect themselves against this adverse selection problem by offering a stock payment, as the
value of such an offer is contingent upon market reactions between the M&A announcement and
the completion of the transaction. Officer et al. (2009) show that acquirer abnormal announcement
returns in acquisitions of targets that are difficult to value (i.e., privately held targets) are
significantly higher if stock is used as the method of payment. They attribute their finding to the
risk-sharing benefits resulting from payments with stock. These contingent payment effects can also
be realized using earnouts and/or by offering convertible bonds or bonds with a junk status. Cash
payments and offers consisting of senior debt securities, on the other hand, are generally considered
to be fixed payments (Bruner 2004). As shown in Table 1, we expect contingent payments to be
more likely if the target’s value is more uncertain.
If external auditors succeed in reducing information asymmetry (and hence, uncertainty) about
the target’s financial statements, bidders are better able to estimate the target’s value, and hence,
there will be less of a need to offer a contingent payment. Therefore, we hypothesize that the
method of payment is less likely to be contingent if the target company’s financial statements are
audited by a Big N auditor. We test this hypothesis by including a dummy variable that equals 1 for
targets with a Big N auditor. In addition, we control for firms that do not have an external auditor
(i.e., small firms that do not voluntarily opt for an external audit) by including a second dummy
variable.
A second area of information asymmetry relates to the acquirer’s value. Myers and Majluf
(1984) argue that managers of an acquiring firm may want to exploit private information on their
own value by offering shares when they consider their stock to be overvalued. Shleifer and
Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) rely on the information asymmetry
between firm insiders and outsiders in explaining M&A activity. Shleifer and Vishny (2003)
model the behavior of acquiring managers and conclude that managers in overvalued firms have
TABLE 1





U Contingent payments to
reduce risk over target.
U Contingent payments to
reduce risk over target.




No incentive to offer stock
payments.
U Exploit market conditions by
offering overvalued stock.
This table provides an overview of the incentive for contingent payments based upon whether the acquirer is over- or
undervalued, and on target uncertainty.
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an incentive to engage in stock acquisitions (see also Table 1). Faccio and Masulis (2005) and
Martin (1996) show that bidding firms are indeed more inclined to pay with stock if the stock is
highly valued. Consequently, several studies show lower bidder announcement as well as long-
term returns for M&As paid using stock (e.g., Loughran and Vijh 1997; Bruner 2004; Travlos
1987). Although the bidding firm has the right to decide upon the method of payment, the
question arises of why target shareholders would be willing to accept stock offers given the
potential market-timing behavior of acquirers. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that
targets will accept these stock offers because they tend to over-estimate the value of synergy
benefits in an overvalued market.
The market-timing behavior of acquirers rests on the assumption of information asymmetry
between the acquiring firm’s management and investors, which allows for overvaluation in the
market. The extent of overvaluation has often been proxied in prior studies by the stock price run-
up in the pre-M&A period (e.g., Faccio and Masulis 2005; Martin 1996). However, because we
consider a sample of both listed and private firms, we use the average market-wide price-earnings
(P/E) ratio in the year of the transaction to capture stock market overvaluation.5 If acquirers
indeed try to time the market, we expect them to opt for contingent payments in periods of high
stock prices (see Table 1). Studies investigating M&A activity at a macro-economic level show
that a market-wide increase in stock prices is typically followed by an increase in merger activity
(e.g., Verter 2002; Clarke and Ioannidis 1996; Guerard 1985). Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and
Teoh (2006) demonstrate that this finding can be explained by a higher likelihood of paying with
overvalued stock in periods of bull markets. Furthermore, they argue that target shareholders
accept overvalued stock in booming stock markets in order to ‘‘cash out’’ of their firms (see also,
Shleifer and Vishny 2003). In addition, privately held firms might be valued at a higher price in
periods of booming stock prices because of higher industry multiples or a lower cost of capital (a
lower market risk premium) in a discounted cash flow valuation, although high valuation is less
visible than with publicly quoted firms. Based on these arguments, we hypothesize a positive
impact of the market-wide P/E ratio on the likelihood of contingent payments. Next, for the
subsample of M&As initiated by publicly listed acquirers, we also measure acquirer valuation at
the firm level. Although this step is not possible for target firms (given the relatively low fraction
of listed firms), we proxy individual target valuation using the ratio of the offer price to the
target’s book value.
The exploitation of temporary misvaluation is more likely when greater information
asymmetry exists between managers and outside suppliers of capital. Because we assume that
external auditors succeed in mitigating information asymmetry, we expect them to reduce the
likelihood of market timing behavior. We test this prediction by including an interaction term for
the average-wide P/E ratio and a dummy variable that equals 1 for acquirers audited by a Big N
auditor. We expect a negative impact of this interaction term on the probability of a contingent
offer. Consistent with this prediction, Chang et al. (2009) show that debt ratios of Big N clients
are less affected by overvaluation. Finally, we also include the dummy variable for Big N clients
as a single term to control for the fact that target shareholders may be more inclined to accept
bidder stock if the bidder is audited by a Big N auditor. Unlike for the targets, we do not
separately control for acquirers that do not have an external financial statement auditor, as this is
the case for only seven acquirers in our total sample. Erickson and Wang (1999) show that
acquiring firms try to manage their earnings upwards prior to stock-for-stock mergers. Given that
high-quality auditors seem to succeed in reducing earnings management (e.g., Becker et al. 1998;
5 We also test the robustness of our results by replacing the P/E by the P/B (price-to-book ratio) in our regression
models.
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Francis et al. 1999), target shareholders are more likely to be confident about the bidder’s value
and, hence, to accept stock as a method of payment. We therefore expect a positive impact of the
ordinal acquirer’s audit variable on the likelihood of a contingent offer.
Control Variables
We control for several deal and firm characteristics that have been found to be important
determinants of the method of payment in prior studies. One important variable is the industry-
relatedness of the transaction. Taking into account shareholder investment preferences, target
shareholders are more likely to invest in the shares of the newly combined firm and, hence, to
accept stock offers, if the acquiring firm is operating in the same industry as the target firm. Many
studies provide evidence of an increased likelihood of stock payment in industry-related M&As
(e.g., Swieringa and Schauten 2008; Faccio and Masulis 2005). We test the impact of industry-
relatedness by including a dummy variable that captures whether the combining firms were
operating in the same four-digit SIC industry before the M&A. Alternatively, we also define
relatedness at the two-digit SIC level.
The listing status of bidder and target is expected to be another major determinant of the
method of payment. Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that shareholders of unlisted targets are
unlikely to accept stock offers because of the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio
holdings. Our sample includes offers initiated by both listed and private bidders. Unlisted bidders
may be reluctant to offer stock because they are expected to care more about preserving control.
Shareholders of privately held acquirers will avoid diluting their controlling stake. Furthermore,
target investors may be unwilling to accept unlisted bidder stock. Therefore, we include two
dummy variables in our regression models to capture whether or not target and bidder are quoted on
a stock exchange.
We also control for the size of the target relative to that of the bidder. This variable is likely
to serve as a proxy for the bargaining power of the target firm relative to that of the acquirer.
Ahern (2012) argues that relative target size captures bargaining power in M&A transactions
because smaller targets are less likely to withstand a price war. Next, Hansen (1987) predicts that
the impact of information asymmetry and, hence, the contingent pricing effect of a stock offer,
will be higher if the target is larger relative to the bidder. Findings supporting this prediction
have been presented by Faccio and Masulis (2005), Martynova and Renneboog (2009) and
Swieringa and Schauten (2008), among others. However, other scholars do not find evidence of a
significant impact of relative size on the method of payment (e.g., Martin 1996; Ghosh and
Ruland 1998). In addition, following Faccio and Masulis (2005), we also control for the size of
the bidding firm, as large bidders typically have a greater debt capacity due to their lower
expected bankruptcy costs.6
Another important consideration is the relationship of the method of payment with financing
decisions. Whereas stock payments generally imply the issue of new shares (or the use of shares in
treasury), cash offers are more likely to be financed with available cash reserves or new loans (e.g.,
Bruner 2004; Martynova and Renneboog 2009). Hence, the payment considerations will also
depend on the financing decision. Pecking order theory states that firms prefer internal over external
financing and debt over equity in attracting external finance (Myers 1984). We proxy the
availability of cash reserves by calculating the bidder’s and target’s ratio of cash to total assets.
Next, the capacity to obtain new loans depends upon several factors. Following Faccio and Masulis
(2005), we consider the impact of collateral (measured as property, plant, and equipment [PPE]/
6 We also estimate alternative models in which we include the target size in addition to that of the bidder (not
reported), but this process does not alter our conclusions.
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total assets) and pre-M&A leverage (debt/total assets). We consider these variables for bidders as
well as targets because the target’s PPE and debt capacity may help the acquiring firm to obtain new
loans. Moreover, we include the ratio of EBITDA/total assets to capture the cash generating ability
of the combining firms.
We face some data limitations due to our focus on a sample that includes many private targets
and acquirers. More specifically, we can neither control for the market-to-book ratio of the
combining firms nor for their ownership structure. In the absence of detailed ownership data, we
focus on the distinction between listed and unlisted firms because ownership will be less dispersed
for private firms.
Our hypotheses and the expected impact of the control variables are summarized in Table 2.
SAMPLE
The M&As considered in this study were collected from the Zephyr database, which contains
detailed information on more than 500,000 M&As worldwide, with pan-European deals dating
back to 1997. No minimum deal value is required for deals to be included in this database. In
addition, M&As involving public as well as private bidders are covered. Compared to the SDC
Platinum database of Thomson Financial and Mergerstat, the Zephyr database covers smaller deals
and has better coverage of European transactions (e.g., Huyghebaert and Luypaert 2010). Auditor
and accounting data are obtained from Belfirst. This database contains financial statement data for
Belgian and Luxembourg firms. Both Zephyr and Belfirst are commercialized by Bureau Van Dijk.
We use several selection criteria to obtain our final sample. First, we consider M&As between
Belgian firms that were completed during the period 1997–2009. This step generates an initial
sample of 739 deals. Next, we only consider deals with a real change in control over the target’s
resources. Hence, the total stake that the bidder aims to achieve in the target post-M&A has to
exceed 50 percent for the deal to be retained in our sample. Furthermore, we drop all deals in which
the bidding company already owned 50 percent of the target stock before the M&A announcement
date. This leaves us with a sample of 646 transactions. In addition, we need data on the method of
payment, as this is the focus of our study. This information is available for 102 deals in Zephyr.
However, by cross-checking with Thomson’s SDC, we were able to collect payment data on 36
additional deals, which generated a total sample of 139 deals. The significant drop in sample size
due to this selection criterion is driven by the lack of payment information for the very small deals.7
Finally, we only retain the deals for which we have auditor information in the pre-M&A year for the
combining firms, resulting in a final sample of 125 deals.8
Table 3 provides an overview of various deal characteristics of the M&As in our sample by
year. First, we observe that nearly one-third (31.20 percent) of all M&As occur between two firms
that are operating in the same main industry according to their four-digit U.S. SIC codes. Next,
following Bruner (2004), we differentiate between contingent, mixed, and fixed payments.
7 To test the representativeness of our final sample, we compare the firm characteristics across two datasets (the
initial population and the final dataset). This analysis shows that the sample targets and acquirers are larger than
the average targets and acquirers in the initial M&A population. Likewise, a considerably larger fraction of
sample firms is listed on a stock exchange. This is unsurprising given that the availability of information
(especially on means of payment) is significantly higher for M&As of larger and stock-quoted firms. Hence, a
limitation of our study is that our conclusions might not be generalizable to the entire M&A population; they
might be more generalizable to larger deals with publicly available payment information. Except for the debt
ratio, which is found to be higher for the sample firms (and which might be related to the larger fraction of
financial firms in our sample), the firm characteristics seem to be comparable across the two groups. A detailed
analysis can be obtained from the authors upon request.
8 This means that we were able to determine whether an external auditor had been appointed and that we
succeeded in determining the auditor’s name (if applicable).
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All-equity offers and earnouts are considered contingent payments, whereas all-cash offers, debt
offers and offers consisting of cash and debt are categorized as fixed payments. Offers consisting of
either equity or earnouts and cash are considered mixed offers. We note that 75.20 percent of all
M&As are settled with fixed offers, whereas only 19.20 percent of the transactions are paid for by
TABLE 2







Hypothesis 1: Target information asymmetry
TAR_BIGN Binary variable that equals 1 for targets having
a Big N auditor.

TAR_NO_AUDIT Binary variable that equals 1 for targets that do
not have their financial statements audited.
þ
Hypothesis 2: Acquirer information asymmetry
PE_BEL20 Average Price/Earnings multiple for the BEL 20
in the year of the transaction.
þ
PE_BEL20  ACQ_BIGN Interaction term between the P/E for the BEL 20
and the ordinal acquirer audit variable.

ACQ_BIGN Binary variable that equals 1 for acquirers having
a Big N auditor.
þ
Control variables
RELATED Dummy variable equaling 1 if target and acquirer
are operating in the same four- (two-) digit
SIC industry.
þ
TAR_LISTED Dummy variable equaling 1 if the target is
publicly quoted.
þ
ACQ_LISTED Dummy variable equaling 1 if the acquirer is
publicly quoted.
þ
TAR_FIN Dummy variable equaling 1 if the target’s main
SIC code starts with 6.
?
ACQ_FIN Dummy variable equaling 1 if the acquirer’s main
SIC code starts with 6.
?
REL_SIZE Target Total Assets/Acquirer Total Assets. þ
ACQ_SIZE Ln(Acquirer Total Assets). 
TAR_CASH Target Cash/Total assets. 
ACQ_CASH Acquirer Cash/Total assets. 
TAR_PPE Target PPE/Total assets. 
ACQ_PPE Acquirer PPE/Total assets. 
TAR_DEBT Target Debt/Total assets. þ
ACQ_DEBT Acquirer Debt/Total assets. þ
TAR_EBITDA Target EBITDA/Total assets. 
ACQ_EBITDA Acquirer EBITDA/Total assets. 
This table provides an overview of the different explanatory variables in our analysis and presents our theoretical
predictions.
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means of a contingent offer. Hence, 5.60 percent of the deals are based on mixed offers. Cash is the
dominant method of payment (70.40 percent), whereas 17.60 percent of all deals are settled with a
stock swap. 4.00 percent of all M&As are paid for using a combination of cash and shares. Debt
(2.40 percent), mixed cash/debt (2.40 percent), earnout (1.60 percent), and mixed cash/earnout
(1.60 percent) offers are observed less frequently.9
The descriptive statistics that indicate the relationship between auditor type and method of
payment are summarized in Table 4. We distinguish between Big N clients, non-Big N clients, and
small firms that choose not to have their financial statements audited. The Big N auditors are
defined as the N largest international audit firms. For our sample period, Big N refers to the six
largest audit firms until 1998 (i.e., Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte
& Touche, Price Waterhouse, and KPMG), the five largest audit firms between 1998 and 2001 (due
to the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand, which created PwC), and finally, the
four largest audit firms as of the demise of Arthur Andersen, following the Enron scandal. Panel A
in Table 4 shows that the number of targets with a Big N auditor is similar to the number of targets
with a non-Big N auditor (52 and 48, respectively). Twenty-five targets are small firms that did not
opt for voluntary audits. We also note that the fraction of contingent deals is higher for the non-Big
N targets (25.00 percent compared to 17.31 percent for Big N targets), although the difference is not
significant. Concerning the acquirers, we note that the majority are audited by Big N audit firms (74
versus 44 non-Big N acquirers) and that only 7 of the acquirers in our sample do not have their
financial statements audited. Panel B distinguishes between listed and unlisted targets and acquirers.
We clearly observe that the method of payment and the auditor type varies well across listed and
privately held firms. For the acquirers, the number of listed and non-listed firms is nearly equal (71
out of 125 bidders are listed), whereas the fraction of listed targets is considerably smaller (23 of
125 targets). This finding is consistent with the European sample of Faccio and Masulis (2005), in
which listed targets represent only 15.87 percent of all deals. The percentage of non-listed firms
with a Big N auditor in our sample equals 36.27 percent for the target firms (37 of 102 non-listed
firms) and 50.00 percent for the acquiring firms (27 of 54 non-listed firms).
Table 5 reports summary statistics for the firm variables that may play a role in determining the
method of payment and that, hence, will be controlled for in the multivariate regression models.
These firm characteristics are measured in the year before the transaction. To limit the influence of
potential outliers, we winsorize all firm variables at the 5 percent level. Table 5 indicates that the
acquirers are significantly larger than their targets. Furthermore, the targets hold a significantly
larger fraction of their total assets in cash and tangible assets than the acquirers do, although the two
groups have similar debt ratios. Also, the acquirers in our sample are less profitable, as measured by
their EBITDA/total assets, than their targets are. Concerning the binary variables, we observe that a
larger fraction of the acquirers are listed on a stock exchange (56.80 percent compared to only 18.40
percent for the targets). Finally, 19.20 percent of the targets and 33.60 percent of the acquirers
operate in a financial industry (as is indicated by main SIC code starting with 6).
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
This section provides an overview of our multivariate regression results. We first report results
based on an ordered probit regression analysis controlling for potential self-selection bias. Next, we
estimate binary probit regressions to explain the likelihood of a contingent M&A payment. Finally,
we perform several other robustness checks.
9 Earnouts can be defined as deferred payments that are contingent on future post-M&A performance (see, for
example, Bruner 2004).
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Ordered Probit Regression Models
Following Faccio and Masulis (2005), we estimate ordered probit regression models to
investigate the antecedents of the method of payment. The regression results are presented in Table
6. The dependent variable equals 0 for purely fixed payments, 1 for mixed payments, and 2 for
purely contingent payments. The impact of the target’s external financial statement audit is
TABLE 4
Type of Auditors and Method of Payment
Panel A: Univariate Relation between the Type of Auditor and the Method of Payment






or No Auditorn % n % n % n %
Targets
Big N 9 17.31% 2 3.85% 41 78.85% 52 100.00% 0.6661
Non-Big N 12 25.00% 1 2.08% 35 72.92% 48 100.00%
No audit 3 12.00% 4 16.00% 18 72.00% 25 100.00%
Acquirers
Big N 11 14.86% 5 6.76% 58 78.38% 74 100.00% 0.2934
Non-Big N 12 27.27% 2 4.55% 30 68.18% 44 100.00%
No audit 1 14.29% 0 0.00% 6 85.71% 7 100.00%
Panel B: Type of Auditor and Method of Payment for Listed versus Unlisted Firms
Contingent Mixed Fixed Total
n % n % n % n %
Targets
Listed Big N 3 20.00% 0 0.00% 12 80.00% 15 100.00%
Non-Big N 4 50.00% 0 0.00% 4 50.00% 8 100.00%
Big N 6 16.22% 2 5.41% 29 78.38% 37 100.00%
Unlisted Non-Big N 8 20.00% 1 2.50% 31 77.50% 40 100.00%
No audit 3 12.00% 4 16.00% 18 72.00% 25 100.00%
Acquirers
Listed Big N 10 21.28% 5 10.64% 32 68.09% 47 100.00%
Non-Big N 8 33.33% 1 4.17% 15 62.50% 24 100.00%
Big N 1 3.70% 0 0.00% 26 96.30% 27 100.00%
Unlisted Non-Big N 4 20.00% 1 5.00% 15 75.00% 20 100.00%
No audit 1 14.29% 0 0.00% 6 85.71% 7 100.00%
This table provides summary statistics on the univariate relation between the type of auditor of target and bidder (Big N,
non-Big N or no audit at all), and the method of payment. All-equity offers and earnouts are considered as contingent
payments, while all-cash, debt and offers consisting of cash, and debt are categorized as fixed payments. Offers
consisting of either equity or earnouts and cash are considered as mixed offers. Panel B distinguishes between listed and
unlisted firms.
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investigated by including two dummy variables. The first dummy equals 1 if the acquirer is audited
by a Big N audit firm. The second dummy variable captures small targets that do not opt for a
voluntary financial statement audit. For the acquirer, we only include one dummy variable (which
equals 1 for Big N clients) because only seven acquirers do not have their financial statements
audited.10 We also control for other factors that have been found to influence the method of
payment in prior studies, as described in the previous section and summarized in Table 2. Because a
large fraction of the acquirers (33.60 percent) and targets (19.20 percent) are financial firms, we add
two dummy variables that capture their impact. All of the banks, insurance firms, real estate firms,
and holdings are considered financial firms, i.e., they are all firms with an SIC code that begins with
6. Because certain accounting data are missing for some observations, we also report the results that
we obtained using models in which we only include acquirer characteristics or include no firm
TABLE 5
Firm Characteristics
Panel A: Continuous Variables
Targets Acquirers p-value for Difference
Mean Median
Std.






SIZE 9.40 9.16 2.00 11.38 11.34 2.24 0.0000 0.0000
CASH 13.69% 6.24% 16.36% 9.27% 3.34% 12.51% 0.0256 0.0272
PPE 26.24% 13.93% 28.77% 12.13% 1.02% 23.88% 0.0001 0.0000
DEBT 44.91% 31.20% 56.55% 41.57% 25.12% 43.72% 0.6259 0.5822
EBITDA 10.05% 8.60% 15.37% 3.49% 1.46% 7.36% 0.0001 0.0000
Panel B: Binary Variables
Targets Acquirers p-value for Difference






Listed 23 18.40% 71 56.80% 0.0000 0.0000
Financial (SIC code starting with 6) 24 19.20% 42 33.60% 0.0097 0.0100
In this table, we report the mean, median, and standard deviation of the firm characteristics for the acquirers, and targets
in our sample. All variables are winsorized at 5–95 percent, i.e., extreme values are replaced by the corresponding
percentiles. The p-values of two-tailed significance tests are also reported. The firm characteristics are defined as follows:
Variable Definitions:
SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of total assets;
PPE ¼ ratio of property, plant, and equipment relative to total assets;
DEBT ¼ ratio of debt relative to total assets; and
EBITDA ¼ ratio of EBITDA relative to its total assets.
10 We also test the robustness of our results by estimating our regression models for a sample without these seven
observations, and our conclusions remain valid. These results are not reported but may be obtained from the
authors on request.
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TABLE 6
Ordered Probit Regression Models
(1) (2) (3)
C1 12.2292** 11.1664*** 9.5048***
(0.0120) (0.0028) (0.0003)
C2 12.6222*** 11.5375*** 9.7730***
(0.0098) (0.0019) (0.0002)
TAR_BIGN 0.9809** 0.9668** 0.6122*
(0.0328) (0.0304) (0.0660)
TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.0400 0.2920 0.0033
(0.9396) (0.5258) (0.9931)
PE_BEL20 1.0100*** 0.8978*** 0.6091***
(0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0025)
PE_BEL20  ACQ_BIGN 0.5430*** 0.4944*** 0.2979***
(0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0081)
ACQ_BIGN 7.2623*** 6.3677*** 3.6809**
(0.0017) (0.0006) (0.0102)
RELATED 1.0178** 0.9583*** 0.9680***
(0.0167) (0.0067) (0.0011)
TAR_LISTED 0.2081 0.0318 0.2111
(0.7932) (0.9604) (0.6205)
ACQ_LISTED 1.7467*** 2.0436*** 1.3213***
(0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000)
TAR_FIN 1.7121*** 1.5253*** 1.4788***
(0.0066) (0.0028) (0.0003)






















Pseudo R2 0.3642 0.3169 0.2476
n 95 105 125
(continued on next page)
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variables at all. A check of the correlations among the various explanatory variables (see Appendix
A) reveals that none are too highly correlated (the pairwise correlations do not exceed 0.5). The
variance inflation factors never exceed five. All regressions are run using White’s heteroscedas-
ticity-corrected standard errors.
The results presented in Table 6 provide support for our two hypotheses. First, we observe that
the likelihood of a contingent payment is significantly lower if the target company is audited by a
Big N audit firm.11 This finding suggests that the incentive to share the M&A-risk through a stock
payment or earnout is less substantial if the target is a Big N client, supporting the notion that a
high-quality audit reduces the information asymmetry related to the target’s value in M&A
transactions. Second, we find that acquirers are significantly more likely to offer contingent
payments in periods of high P/E ratios, which indicates that they try to time the market by offering
overvalued stock.12 This observation is consistent with earlier findings by Dong et al. (2006),
Verter (2002), and Clarke and Ioannidis (1996), among others. Nevertheless, the coefficient of the
interaction term for the market-wide P/E ratio and the acquirer audit variable is found to be
significantly negative, which confirms our hypothesis that acquirers see fewer opportunities to
exploit private information on their own value if they are audited by a Big N auditor. Finally, the
acquirer audit variable as a single term has a significantly positive effect on the likelihood of using a
contingent payment. This finding suggests that target shareholders are more willing to accept stock
offers or earnouts if the acquirer’s financial statements are certified by a Big N auditor. Taken
together, our results suggest that Big N auditors (at both the target and the acquirer level) reduce
information asymmetry. This conclusion holds under different specifications (i.e., with and without
the inclusion of firm characteristics).
Some of the control variables are also found to be significant in explaining the method of
payment. More specifically, acquirers are more likely to opt for contingent payments in industry-
TABLE 6 (continued)
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, according to a two-tailed
test.
This table presents the regression output from ordered probit regression models where the dependent variable equals 0
for purely fixed payments, 1 for mixed payments, and 2 for purely contingent payments. The p-values are reported in
parentheses. The explanatory variables are defined as follows:
Variable Definitions:
TAR_BIGN (ACQ_BIGN) ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having a Big N auditor;
TAR_NO_AUDIT ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets that do not have their financial statements audited;
PE_BEL20 ¼ average price/earnings multiple for the BEL 20 in the year of the transaction;
RELATED ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if target and acquirer are operating in the same four-digit SIC industry;
TAR_LISTED (ACQ_LISTED)¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer) is publicly quoted;
TAR_FIN (ACQ_FIN)¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer)’s main SIC code starts with 6;
REL_SIZE ¼ ratio of target’s total assets relative to the acquirer’s;
ACQ_SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets;
TAR_CASH (ACQ_CASH) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) cash relative to its total assets;
TAR_PPE (ACQ_PPE)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) property, plant, and equipment relative to its total assets;
TAR_DEBT (ACQ_DEBT)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) debt relative to its total assets; and
TAR_EBITDA (ACQ_EBITDA) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) EBITDA relative to its total assets.
11 This variable is found to be significant at the 5 percent level in the first two models but only at the 10 percent
level in model 3.
12 We also test the robustness of our results when the market-wide P/B is used instead of the P/E. These models can
only be estimated for the deals after 2000 because no P/B information is provided for the earlier years. Our
results prove to be robust.
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related transactions. This finding might indicate that target shareholders are more likely to accept
shares of the newly combined firm if the acquiring firm is operating in the same industry as the
target firm. This conclusion is consistent with prior empirical findings (e.g., Swieringa and
Schauten 2008; Faccio and Masulis 2005). The acquiring firm’s listing status is another major
determinant of the method of payment. As expected, the likelihood of a contingent payment is
significantly higher if the acquiring firm is quoted on a stock exchange. This finding supports the
idea that shareholders of private acquirers avoid diluting their controlling stake and that
shareholders of target firms are unwilling to accept unlisted bidder stock. Nevertheless, the target’s
listing status is not found to be significant in our regression models. We also observe that
acquisitions of targets in the financial industry are more likely to be settled with contingent
payments. The results also indicate that larger acquirers are less likely to opt for contingent
payments. This finding might be explained by the relatively larger debt capacity of these firms,
which increases their ability to offer all-cash payments (Faccio and Masulis 2005). We do not
detect a significant influence of relative size on the method of payment; these results support the
previous findings by Martin (1996) and Ghosh and Ruland (1998). Next, consistent with the idea
that firms prefer to use available cash reserves rather than external financing, the target’s cash ratio
is significantly and negatively associated with the likelihood of a contingent payment. The
acquirer’s cash position, on the other hand, is not found to be significant. The level of PPE of the
target and acquirer are not found to affect the method of payment. Likewise, the combining firms’
debt levels and cash generating ability (proxied by EBITDA) bear no significant relationship to the
method of payment.
The results presented in Table 7 show that our findings are robust to the use of alternative
proxies for large auditors. The coefficients for the different dummy variables capturing large target
auditors (which indicate the top 5 auditors, the top 10 auditors, and the auditors with a market share
of at least 5 percent based on their number of clients and on those clients’ assets) are found to be
significantly negative. Our findings regarding the impact of the acquiring firm’s auditor are also
robust, showing that large auditors succeed in mitigating market timing behavior. The impact of the
dummy variable indicating whether the acquiring firm’s auditor is in the top 10 (based on client
assets) is somewhat weaker but is still significant at the 10 percent level.
Controlling for Potential Self-Selection
The endogenous nature of auditor choice could induce self-selection bias due to Big N auditors
refusing to audit certain types of firms or due to clients’ preference for either Big N or non-Big N
auditors based on their specific characteristics (e.g., Lawrence et al. 2011; Lennox and Pittman 2010;
Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007). Therefore, we control for potential selection bias in two alternative
ways. First, Lennox and Pittman (2010) argue that screening and selection are more likely to engender
endogeneity if audit firm tenure is short. On this basis, we control for auditor switching before the
M&A. Because the auditor is appointed for a period of three years according to Belgian law, we
investigate a three-year pre-M&A period. Our results show that only 0.80 percent of the acquirers and
4.80 percent of the targets in our sample transitioned from a non-Big N auditor to a Big N auditor (or
vice versa) during the three-year period before the M&A, which indicates auditor changes based on a
future M&A seldom occur. Moreover, estimating our model for the subsample of deals without an
auditor change pre-M&A (for either the bidder or the target) does not affect our findings. These
results are not reported but can be obtained from the authors upon request.
Second, we use propensity-score matching as developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
This technique has been used in recent studies such as Lawrence et al. (2011), Armstrong,
Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010) and Doyle et al. (2007). The purpose of the technique is to match
Big N and non-Big N clients with regard to a broad range of firm characteristics. This methodology
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TABLE 7
Alternative Auditor Size Proxies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C1 11.4554** 12.4280** 11.6136** 11.6991** 7.2887* 11.8465**
(0.0190) (0.0200) (0.0164) (0.0213) (0.0622) (0.0255)
C2 11.8554** 12.7960** 12.0137** 12.1050** 7.6656* 12.2558**













TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.1790 0.0107 0.1164 0.3012 0.3488 0.2473
(0.7563) (0.9839) (0.8214) (0.6015) (0.5514) (0.6552)
PE_BEL20 0.8954** 1.0027** 0.9685*** 0.9390** 0.5645** 0.9721**





































RELATED 1.1197*** 1.0027** 0.9647** 1.0981*** 1.1448*** 1.0968***
(0.0076) (0.0234) (0.0225) (0.0086) (0.0076) (0.0086)
TAR_LISTED 0.4207 0.3263 0.1833 0.2995 0.4255 0.2105
(0.5763) (0.6670) (0.8166) (0.6981) (0.5370) (0.7944)
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 7 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ACQ_LISTED 1.8018*** 1.4947*** 1.7477*** 1.8977*** 1.7056*** 1.9631***
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
TAR_FIN 1.9090*** 1.3104** 1.7162*** 1.9670*** 1.5732*** 1.9798***
(0.0006) (0.0307) (0.0056) (0.0006) (0.0058) (0.0008)
ACQ_FIN 0.0750 0.2225 0.2460 0.0007 0.1607 0.1152
(0.8862) (0.6688) (0.6014) (0.9988) (0.7499) (0.8174)
REL_SIZE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(0.6599) (0.4028) (0.2978) (0.3957) (0.6074) (0.2827)
ACQ_SIZE 0.1402 0.1665 0.2668** 0.2155* 0.1113 0.2742**
(0.1927) (0.2017) (0.0213) (0.0596) (0.2948) (0.0208)
TAR_CASH 3.2007** 2.9432** 3.4514*** 3.3649*** 3.0975*** 3.5204***
(0.0105) (0.0166) (0.0081) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0079)
ACQ_CASH 0.4751 0.0571 0.6349 0.7944 0.2638 0.8309
(0.7648) (0.9695) (0.6812) (0.6288) (0.8618) (0.6060)
TAR_PPE 0.8784 0.2990 0.2247 0.7127 0.6327 0.6890
(0.2960) (0.7378) (0.7992) (0.3978) (0.4457) (0.4214)
ACQ_PPE 0.8418 1.0873 1.1022 0.8665 0.9341 0.8504
(0.3285) (0.1829) (0.2412) (0.3343) (0.2558) (0.3623)
TAR_DEBT 0.0547 0.1758 0.1164 0.0413 0.0147 0.0610
(0.8680) (0.6010) (0.7230) (0.8999) (0.9648) (0.8541)
ACQ_DEBT 0.0034 0.1493 0.0522 0.1559 0.0357 0.1860
(0.9954) (0.8076) (0.9313) (0.7973) (0.9556) (0.7548)
TAR_EBITDA 1.7487 1.6188 1.5409 1.7151 1.5317 1.9681
(0.1724) (0.1996) (0.2233) (0.1758) (0.1877) (0.1390)
ACQ_EBITDA 3.6940 2.4634 3.7963 4.4347 4.2117 4.7210
(0.2762) (0.4839) (0.2833) (0.2053) (0.2184) (0.1860)
Pseudo R2 0.3717 0.3316 0.3725 0.3796 0.3452 0.3847
n 95 95 95 95 95 95
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, according to a two-tailed
test, respectively.
This table presents the regression output from ordered probit regression models where the dependent variable equals 0
for purely fixed payments, 1 for mixed payments, and 2 for purely contingent payments. The p-values are reported in
parentheses.
Variable Definitions:
TAR_TOP5/10_CLIENTS (ACQ_TOP5/10_CLIENTS) ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having an
auditor that is within the 5/10 largest in Belgium according to the number of clients;
TAR_TOP5/10_ASSETS (ACQ_TOP5/10_ASSETS)¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having a Big N
auditor that is within the 5/10 largest in Belgium according to client assets;
TAR_.5%_CLIENTS (ACQ_.5%_CLIENTS)¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having an auditor
that has a market share larger than 5 percent in Belgium according to the number of clients;
TAR_.5%_ASSETS (ACQ_.5%_ASSETS)¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having an auditor that
has a market share larger than 5 percent in Belgium according to client assets;
TAR_NO_AUDIT ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets that do not have their financial statements audited;
PE_BEL20¼ average price/earnings multiple for the BEL 20 in the year of the transaction;
RELATED¼ binary variable equaling 1 if target and acquirer are operating in the same four- (two-) digit SIC industry;
TAR_LISTED (ACQ_LISTED) ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer) is publicly quoted;
TAR_FIN (ACQ_FIN) ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer)’s main SIC code starts with 6;
REL_SIZE ¼ ratio of target’s total assets relative to the acquirer’s;
ACQ_SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets;
TAR_CASH (ACQ_CASH)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) cash relative to its total assets;
TAR_PPE (ACQ_PPE) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) property, plant, and equipment relative to its total assets;
TAR_DEBT (ACQ_DEBT) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) debt relative to its total assets; and
TAR_EBITDA (ACQ_EBITDA)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) EBITDA relative to its total assets.
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has important advantages. First, matching models do not rely on a specific functional form and thus
provide a more direct estimate of the treatment effect (Lawrence et al. 2011). Second, there is no
need to define exclusion restrictions as in two-stage selection models (Lennox, Francis, and Wang
2012). We implement the matching procedure in our study by estimating a probit regression to
predict the propensity to hire a Big N auditor. Following Lawrence et al. (2011) and Chaney, Jetter,
and Shivakumar (2004), we include the firm’s size (the natural logarithm of total assets), its ROA
(EBIT/assets), its debt ratio (total liabilities/total assets) and its current ratio (current assets/current
liabilities) as explanatory variables in our regression models. Finally, because our sample includes
both listed and privately held firms, we control for listing status. This model is estimated for the
most recent data available in the entire Belfirst database (for all firms with auditor data). The
regression output presented in Table 8 shows that firm size, the debt ratio, and the current ratio are
significantly positively related to the decision to hire a Big N auditor. These conclusions and the
explanatory power of the model are consistent with the findings of Chaney et al. (2004).13
TABLE 8













% of correct predictions 61.48%
n 14775
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, according to a two-tailed
test, respectively.
This table presents the regression output from a binary probit regression model where the dependent variable equals 1 for
Big N clients and 0 for non-Big N clients. The p-values are reported in parentheses.
Variable Definitions:
SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets;
ROA ¼ ratio of EBIT to total assets;
DEBT ¼ ratio of debt relative to total assets;
CURRENT RATIO ¼ ratio of current assets relative to current liabilities; and
LISTED ¼ binary variable equaling 1 for publicly quoted firms.
13 Given that firm size is the client characteristic that is primarily responsible for generating a spurious Big N effect,
we also re-estimate the regressions using a restricted sample (e.g., Feltham, Hughes, and Simunic 1991; Pittman
and Fortin 2004). More specifically, we drop all targets (acquirers) that are larger than the largest target
(acquirer) with a non-Big N auditor and all targets (acquirers) that are smaller than the smallest target (acquirer)
with a Big N auditor. The ordered probit regression results for this restricted sample indicate that our conclusions
concerning both the impact of target auditor size and that of acquirer auditor size are robust. These results are not
reported but can be obtained from the authors on request.
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TABLE 9
Ordered Probit Regression Models Propensity Scores Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3)
C1 8.0131 6.0947 9.1765***
(0.1145) (0.1046) (0.0062)
C2 8.5671* 6.6085* 9.6564***
(0.0927) (0.0772) (0.0040)
TAR_BIGN 1.4815* 1.3154** 0.9337*
(0.0528) (0.0496) (0.0616)
TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.4834 0.5981 0.1831
(0.4285) (0.2840) (0.6971)
PE_BEL20 0.8452** 0.6584*** 0.6210**
(0.0145) (0.0067) (0.0128)
PE_BEL20  ACQ_BIGN 0.4316** 0.3606** 0.3138**
(0.0195) (0.0123) (0.0287)
ACQ_BIGN 5.3219** 4.3868** 3.5364*
(0.0310) (0.0205) (0.0630)
RELATED 1.6185*** 1.2900*** 1.3143***
(0.0012) (0.0036) (0.0004)
TAR_LISTED 1.0648 0.5833 0.0304
(0.2833) (0.4728) (0.9642)
ACQ_LISTED 1.9541*** 2.1149*** 1.5833***
(0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0002)
TAR_FIN 0.6318 0.7229 1.1192**
(0.4274) (0.1928) (0.0340)






















Pseudo R2 0.3736 0.3081 0.2700
n 69 76 76
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Next, we calculate propensity scores for all sample firms based on the estimated probit
regression coefficients. Of all of the acquiring firms in our sample, 44 are non-Big N clients,
whereas 74 are Big N clients. This process allows us to create a balanced sample by matching each
non-Big N acquirer with the Big N acquirer that has the closest propensity score. We do not focus
on matching based on target propensity scores because the sample contains nearly the same number
of non-Big N (48) and Big N (52) targets. Furthermore, the average difference between the
propensity scores of the non-Big N and Big N target firms is only an insignificant 1.15 percent (p-
value¼ 0.8402). The ordered probit regression output for the propensity-score matched sample is
reported in Table 9, and shows that our conclusions concerning both the impact of target auditor
size and that of acquirer auditor size are robust (although the target Big N dummy variable is only
significant at the 5 percent level for model 2 and at the 10 percent level for models 1 and 3). These
results suggest that our conclusions are not driven by the endogenous nature of the auditor size
variable.
Robustness Checks
In addition to ordered probit regressions, we also estimate binary probit regression models
to investigate the determinants of the method of payment.14 In these models, the dependent
variable equals 1 if the M&A is settled with a contingent payment and 0 otherwise. These
additional regression models are presented in Table 10. The results are consistent with our
findings based on the ordered probit regression analysis. Our two hypotheses are again
confirmed by the data. A high-quality financial statement audit is found to reduce information
asymmetry in M&As. We observe a lower likelihood of stock payments in acquisitions of Big
N audited targets (although this finding is only significant at the 10 percent level). In addition,
a Big N audit of the acquiring firm is found to reduce incentives for using overvalued stock and
TABLE 9 (continued)
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, according to a two-tailed
test, respectively.
This table presents the regression output from ordered probit regression models where the dependent variable equals 0
for purely fixed payments, 1 for mixed payments, and 2 for purely contingent payments. The p-values are reported in
parentheses.
Variable Definitions:
TAR_BIGN (ACQ_BIG N) ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having a Big N auditor;
TAR_NO_AUDIT ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets that do not have their financial statements audited;
PE_BEL20 ¼ average price/earnings multiple for the BEL 20 in the year of the transaction;
RELATED ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if target and acquirer are operating in the same four-digit SIC industry;
TAR_LISTED (ACQ_LISTED)¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer) is publicly quoted;
TAR_FIN (ACQ_FIN)¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer)’s main SIC code starts with 6;
REL_SIZE ¼ ratio of target’s total assets relative to the acquirer’s;
ACQ_SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets;
TAR_CASH (ACQ_CASH) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) cash relative to its total assets;
TAR_PPE (ACQ_PPE)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) property, plant, and equipment relative to its total assets;
TAR_DEBT (ACQ_DEBT)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) debt relative to its total assets; and
TAR_EBITDA (ACQ_EBITDA) is the ratio of target (acquirer) EBITDA relative to its total assets.
14 Using logit regressions instead of probit regressions generates similar conclusions. These results are not reported
in the paper but can be obtained from the authors on request.
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C 14.1057** 13.1826*** 10.2352***
(0.0106) (0.0030) (0.0004)
TAR_BIGN 0.9161* 0.9849* 0.5699
(0.0927) (0.0602) (0.1063)
TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.1944 0.1164 0.2314
(0.7133) (0.7973) (0.5507)
PE_BEL20 1.1959*** 1.0622*** 0.6609***
(0.0035) (0.0011) (0.0030)
PE_BEL20  ACQ_BIGN 0.6253*** 0.5614*** 0.3133**
(0.0028) (0.0012) (0.0105)
ACQ_BIGN 8.4142*** 7.3438*** 3.8518**
(0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0126)
RELATED 1.1892*** 1.0599*** 1.0251***
(0.0096) (0.0100) (0.0015)
TAR_LISTED 0.1781 0.0254 0.1101
(0.8293) (0.9705) (0.8002)
ACQ_LISTED 2.1030*** 2.2961*** 1.3639***
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000)
TAR_FIN 1.9225*** 1.7121*** 1.5065***
(0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0003)






















McFadden R2 0.4527 0.4049 0.3011
n 95 105 125
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, according to a two-tailed
test, respectively.
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to increase the likelihood that target shareholders will accept stock offers or earnouts. Finally,
the conclusions regarding the control variables remain unchanged.
We also consider individual firm valuation instead of using market-wide measures.
Because this information is only available for publicly listed firms, we focus on the subsample
of M&As initiated by listed acquirers. Given that the P/E ratio might be temporarily negative
for individual firms, we focus on the P/B in these regression models (measured at the end of
the year preceding the M&A transaction). In addition, because these regressions are estimated
using a smaller sample of deals (only deals by listed acquirers with P/B data available), we
estimate more parsimonious models (including only the control variables that were found to be
significant in the previous models). The results presented in Table 11 clearly illustrate that our
conclusions remain valid. The significantly positive impact of individual acquirer valuation (P/
B) indicates that acquirers try to exploit temporary overvaluation by offering stock payments.
However, the significantly negative impact of the interaction term with the Big N dummy
variable shows that the use of Big N auditors mitigates this effect. In addition, our findings on
the impact of the target auditor and the control variables remain unchanged.
Because only 18.40 percent of all targets are quoted, we cannot test the impact of individual
target firm P/B (or P/E) ratios in the multivariate regression models. Rather, we focus on the ratio of
the offer price to the target firm’s book value. This information is available for 84 of the 125
transactions and amounts to 3.19 on average (1.50 median). Given that we only have the necessary
data for a subsample of deals, we again estimate the parsimonious models including only the
control variables that we found to be significant earlier. In addition, we also test the interaction
effect with the target’s audit quality dummy variable. We find that none of these additional
variables has a statistically significant impact (see Table 12). The p-values for the single term and
for the interactions with target audit quality exceed the 10 percent level. Our conclusions regarding
the impact of acquirer valuation and audit quality are robust. Granted, the target firm Big N dummy
variable does not attain statistical significance in these models. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize
that these models are estimated based on a sample of just 72 observations. In addition, our findings
regarding the control variables remain unchanged except that the acquirer size variable is not found
to be significant in these models.
We also control for the impact of hiring an investment bank, as these professional firms
might offer specialized advice and generate better performance. They might also act as a
‘‘quality stamp,’’ conveying to the public that clients have acted as careful fiduciaries. We
TABLE 10 (continued)
This table presents the regression output from binary probit regression models where the dependent variable equals 1 if
the bidder offers a contingent payment and 0 otherwise. The p-values are reported in parentheses.
Variable Definitions:
TAR_BIGN (ACQ_BIGN) ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having a Big N auditor;
TAR_NO_AUDIT ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets that do not have their financial statements audited;
PE_BEL20 ¼ average price/earnings multiple for the BEL 20 in the year of the transaction;
RELATED ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if target and acquirer are operating in the same four-digit SIC industry;
TAR_LISTED (ACQ_LISTED)¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer) is publicly quoted;
TAR_FIN (ACQ_FIN)¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer)’s main SIC code starts with 6;
REL_SIZE ¼ ratio of target’s total assets relative to the acquirer’s;
ACQ_SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets;
TAR_CASH (ACQ_CASH) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) cash relative to its total assets;
TAR_PPE (ACQ_PPE)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) property, plant, and equipment relative to its total assets;
TAR_DEBT (ACQ_DEBT)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) debt relative to its total assets; and
TAR_EBITDA (ACQ_EBITDA) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) EBITDA relative to its total assets.
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TABLE 11
Acquirer Valuation at Firm Level
Ordered Probit Model Binary Probit
C1 2.0103
(0.5467)
C2 2.2821 C 0.9551
(0.4907) (0.7594)
TAR_BIGN 1.7280** TAR_BIGN 1.6677*
(0.0296) (0.0621)
TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.0476 TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.0977
(0.9642) (0.9287)
ACQ_PB 1.7535*** ACQ_PB 1.6853***
(0.0011) (0.0013)
ACQ_PB  ACQ_BIGN 0.9024*** ACQ_PB  ACQ_BIGN 0.8083***
(0.0019) (0.0022)
ACQ_BIGN 2.7054** ACQ_BIGN 3.4545***
(0.0192) (0.0015)
RELATED 1.8223* RELATED 1.4255
(0.0597) (0.1543)
TAR_LISTED 1.0434 TAR_LISTED 1.8145
(0.3765) (0.1327)
TAR_FIN 3.7739*** TAR_FIN 3.9759***
(0.0000) (0.0001)
ACQ_FIN 1.7865* ACQ_FIN 2.4029**
(0.0737) (0.0304)
REL_SIZE 0.8467 REL_SIZE 0.5490
(0.5966) (0.7147)
ACQ_SIZE 0.2557 ACQ_SIZE 0.6237**
(0.4481) (0.0432)
TAR_CASH 12.3139*** TAR_CASH 13.4569***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Pseudo R2 0.4450 McFadden R2 0.5112
n 42 42
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, according to a two-tailed
test, respectively.
The dependent variable in the first column (Ordered Probit Model) equals 0 for purely fixed payments, 1 for mixed
payments, and 2 for purely contingent payments. In the binary probit model, the dependent variable equals 1 if the bidder
offers a contingent payment, and 0 otherwise. The p-values are reported in parentheses.
Variable Definitions:
TAR_BIGN (ACQ_BIGN)¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having a Big N auditor;
TAR_NO_AUDIT ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets that do not have their financial statements audited;
ACQ_PB ¼ acquirer price-to-book ratio;
RELATED ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if target and acquirer are operating in the same four-digit SIC industry;
TAR_FIN (ACQ_FIN) ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer)’s main SIC code starts with 6;
REL_SIZE ¼ ratio of target’s total assets relative to the acquirer’s; and
ACQ_SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets.
82 Luypaert and Van Caneghem
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
February 2014
TABLE 12







C2 11.8500** C 10.7636**
(0.0216) (0.0257)
TAR_BIGN 0.2236 TAR_BIGN 0.3338
(0.6860) (0.5330)
TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.7070 TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.2978
(0.3257) (0.7148)
OFFER PRICE/BV  TAR_BIGN 0.0389 OFFER PRICE/BV  TAR_BIGN 0.0807
(0.5430) (0.2479)
OFFER PRICE/BV  TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.1789 OFFER PRICE/BV  TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.1623
(0.1025) (0.1482)
OFFER PRICE/BV 0.0087 OFFER PRICE/BV 0.0005
(0.8573) (0.9924)
PE_BEL20 0.8341** PE_BEL20 0.8108**
(0.0323) (0.0281)
PE_BEL20  ACQ_BIGN 0.4251** PE_BEL20  ACQ_BIGN 0.4027**
(0.0294) (0.0327)
ACQ_BIGN 5.2908** ACQ_BIGN 5.0622**
(0.0410) (0.0407)
RELATED 0.7410* RELATED 0.6828
(0.0671) (0.1090)
TAR_LISTED 0.5084 TAR_LISTED 0.4551
(0.4437) (0.4701)
TAR_FIN 2.4741*** TAR_FIN 2.3619***
(0.0020) (0.0019)
ACQ_FIN 0.1584 ACQ_FIN 0.3115
(0.7436) (0.5283)
REL_SIZE 0.0310 REL_SIZE 0.0406
(0.5676) (0.4399)
ACQ_SIZE 0.0050 ACQ_SIZE 0.0550
(0.9634) (0.6126)
TAR_CASH 5.3615*** TAR_CASH 4.8717**
(0.0075) (0.0177)
Pseudo R2 0.3540 McFadden R2 0.3921
n 72 n 72
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, according to a two-tailed
test, respectively.
The dependent variable in the first column (Ordered Probit Model) equals 0 for purely fixed payments, 1 for mixed
payments, and 2 for purely contingent payments. In the binary probit model, the dependent variable equals 1 if the bidder
offers a contingent payment, and 0 otherwise. The p-values are reported in parentheses.
Variable Definitions:
TAR_BIGN (ACQ_BIGN) ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having a Big N auditor;
TAR_NO_AUDIT ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets that do not have their financial statements audited;
OFFER PRICE/BV ¼ ratio of the offer price compared to the target’s book value;
PE_BEL20 ¼ average price/earnings multiple for the BEL 20 in the year of the transaction;
(continued on next page)
Can Auditors Mitigate Information Asymmetry in M&As? 83
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
February 2014
collected data on the use of investment banks through both the Zephyr and Thomson’s SDC
databases. In 26.4 percent of the transactions in our sample, an investment bank advising the
acquiring firm has been identified. This figure is in line with the findings of Russo and Perrini
(2006) based on their sample of European M&As but is significantly lower than what has been
documented in previous studies based on U.S. data (Hayward 2003; Kale, Omesh, and Harley
2003).15 We empirically test the impact of investment bank advice by including two dummy
variables in our regression models. Following Schiereck, Sigl-Grüb, and Unverhau (2009), we
categorize investment banks as ‘‘first tier’’ (the top 10 advisors) or others based on deal values
using the league tables in Thomson’s M&A database.16 In addition, we include a separate
dummy variable to control for those observations without investment bank involvement. Our
results in Table 13 demonstrate that these additional dummies are not significant in explaining
the likelihood of contingent payments and indicate that our conclusions concerning the bidders’
and target firms’ financial statement auditors remain unaffected. The insignificance of these
investment bank dummy variables could be driven by two opposing effects. On the one hand,
hiring financial advice is more likely in case of stock offers, given the more complex nature of
these deals (as outlined above). On the other hand, the risk-reducing benefits of offering stock
might be less necessary when investment banks succeed in mitigating information asymmetry
about the target’s value.
To further assess the robustness of our findings, we perform several other sensitivity
checks. The regression output of these additional tests is not reported in the paper but can be
obtained from the authors on request. We first examine the effect of replacing the two dummy
variables concerning the target’s external audit (Big N and no audit) with one ordinal variable
(which equals 0 for targets without external auditors, 1 for small audit firms, and 2 for Big N
clients). This variable is found to be significantly negative in explaining the likelihood of
contingent payments, confirming our earlier findings. To further explore the issue of voluntary
financial statement audits, we perform an additional robustness check by including a dummy
variable that captures whether targets or acquirers are categorized as ‘‘small’’ (i.e., as having the
option of a voluntary audit). These dummy variables are not found to be important to the
TABLE 12 (continued)
RELATED ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if target and acquirer are operating in the same four-digit SIC industry;
TAR_FIN (ACQ_FIN) ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer)’s main SIC code starts with 6;
REL_SIZE ¼ ratio of target’s total assets relative to the acquirer’s; and
ACQ_SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets.
15 The lower fraction of deals with investment bank involvement in Europe might be driven by distinct transaction
characteristics. Servaes and Zenner (1996) show that investment banks are more likely to be hired in large,
hostile acquisitions that are at least partly paid for with stock. First, hostile deals seldom occur in the Belgian
context. Only one deal in our sample has been identified as hostile. Second, cash payments are much more
prevalent in transactions in Continental European countries than in U.S./U.K. transactions. In our sample, 70.40
percent of deals are pure cash offers, while this amounts to only 44.06 percent for Hayward’s (2003) U.S.
sample. The larger fraction of cash deals in the Belgian setting might be driven by the more concentrated
ownership structure. Belgian firms are typically controlled by reference shareholders (e.g., families, investment
funds, pension funds) who are less likely to issue stock because doing so would dilute their stake in the firm.
16 The following investment banks have been identified as the top 10 financial advisors in European M&As over the
sample period (1997–2009): Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan,
UBS, Rothschild, Citi, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, and Lazard.
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TABLE 13
Ordered Probit Regression Models Controlling for Investment Bank Reputation
(1) (2) (3)
C1 12.0656** 10.9002*** 9.5721***
(0.0130) (0.0055) (0.0003)
C2 12.4639** 11.2727*** 9.8423***
(0.0105) (0.0039) (0.0002)
TOP_TIER_INV_BANK 1.1831 0.3543 0.8193
(0.1983) (0.7217) (0.3688)
NO_INV_BANK 0.5053 0.3461 0.0097
(0.3182) (0.4943) (0.9815)
TAR_BIGN 1.1667** 1.0736** 0.5892*
(0.0121) (0.0156) (0.0784)
TAR_NO_AUDIT 0.0884 0.3230 0.0211
(0.8710) (0.5020) (0.9558)
PE_BEL20 1.0677*** 0.9329*** 0.6021***
(0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0022)
PE_BEL20  ACQ_BIGN 0.5708*** 0.5147*** 0.2939***
(0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0074)
ACQ_BIGN 7.5643*** 6.6033*** 3.6761***
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0090)
RELATED 0.9592** 0.8925** 1.0504***
(0.0241) (0.0139) (0.0007)
TAR_LISTED 0.5960 0.1545 0.2707
(0.4520) (0.8000) (0.5638)
ACQ_LISTED 1.8974*** 2.1382*** 1.3430***
(0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0000)
TAR_FIN 1.6970*** 1.5321*** 1.5225***
(0.0059) (0.0031) (0.0002)
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method of payment. More importantly, the inclusion of these additional variables does not
affect our main conclusions. Next, we estimate industry relatedness at the two-digit SIC level,
and our findings remain unaffected. We also estimate alternative models in which we include
target size in addition to bidder size. The former variable is not found to be significant and does
not alter our conclusions. In addition, we estimate the models with financial leverage instead of
total leverage. This process yields similar conclusions. Finally, we control for M&As that take
place in high-tech industries because these M&As might be affected by greater risk-taking
(Reuer, Shenkar, and Ragozzino 2004). Again, our results are found to be robust.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyze the association between audit quality and the method of payment in a
sample of 125 Belgian M&As during the period 1997–2009. Information asymmetry has been
identified in the literature as one of the determining factors of the method of payment in M&A
transactions. Our empirical results support our prediction that a high-quality audit reduces the
information asymmetry related to both the target’s value and the acquirer’s value. We show that
contingent payments are significantly less likely if the target firm is audited by a Big N auditor. This
conclusion is valid under different specifications. In addition, a Big N audit of the acquiring firm is
found to reduce market timing behavior by acquirers. Also, target shareholders are more likely to







Pseudo R2 0.3740 0.3206 0.2523
n 95 105 125
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, according to a two-tailed
test, respectively.
This table presents the regression output from ordered probit regression models where the dependent variable equals 0
for purely fixed payments, 1 for mixed payments, and 2 for purely contingent payments. The p-values are reported in
parentheses.
Variable Definitions:
TOP_TIER_INV_BANK ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for acquirers hiring a high-reputable investment bank;
NO_INV_BANK ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for acquirers not hiring an investment bank;
TAR_BIGN (ACQ_BIGN)¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets (acquirers) having a Big N auditor;
TAR_NO_AUDIT ¼ binary variable that equals 1 for targets that do not have their financial statements audited;
PE_BEL20¼ average price/earnings multiple for the BEL 20 in the year of the transaction;
RELATED ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if target and acquirer are operating in the same four-digit SIC industry;
TAR_LISTED (ACQ_LISTED) ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer) is publicly quoted;
TAR_FIN (ACQ_FIN) ¼ binary variable equaling 1 if the target (acquirer)’s main SIC code starts with 6;
REL_SIZE ¼ ratio of target’s total assets relative to the acquirer’s;
ACQ_SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets;
TAR_CASH (ACQ_CASH)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) cash relative to its total assets;
TAR_PPE (ACQ_PPE) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) property, plant, and equipment relative to its total assets;
TAR_DEBT (ACQ_DEBT) ¼ ratio of target (acquirer) debt relative to its total assets; and
TAR_EBITDA (ACQ_EBITDA)¼ ratio of target (acquirer) EBITDA relative to its total assets.
86 Luypaert and Van Caneghem
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
February 2014
These findings provide support for the theory that a Big N quality effect reduces information
asymmetry in the Belgian context. In addition, we show that audit quality significantly affects a
firm’s financial choices related to strategically important projects such as M&As. Finally, we also
show that high-quality audits mitigate the market timing behavior of managers.
Our findings have important implications for future research. The results clearly suggest that a
high-quality financial statement audit reduces information asymmetry in M&As. Hence, audit
quality may affect not only the method of payment but also the premium offered, the probability of
deal completion, the extent of value creation on deal announcement, and even synergy following
the M&A. These topics should prove to be interesting avenues for future research. In addition, one
limitation of our study is that our sample is restricted to Belgian transactions. Although we believe
that Belgium is a representative setting for continental European deals, it would be interesting to
determine whether the same conclusions hold in other geographical regions. Finally, our sample
only includes deals for which information regarding the method of payment is publicly available.
Because these deals typically involve larger firms, our results might not be generalizable to the
entire population of smaller M&A transactions.
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